AI Privacy IncidentMay 27, 2026

Claude AI user data directory exfiltration via malicious npm package

Vendor: Anthropic
Product: Claude
Severity: medium
Status: ongoing
Users affected: undisclosed; package estimated at 676 downloads before detection

Summary

On May 27, 2026, OX Security researchers identified a malicious npm package, mouse5212-super-formatter, designed to exfiltrate files from /mnt/user-data, the directory Anthropic's Claude AI uses to handle user uploads and outputs. The package had an estimated 676 downloads before detection. The attacker embedded their own GitHub private token in the package source; OX Security used it to attribute the account, which was subsequently deleted. As of the OX Security report, the package remained available on npm.

What happened

  • mouse5212-super-formatter was published to npm on May 27, 2026, presenting itself as an "archive deployment sync" utility.
  • Its postinstall script authenticated to GitHub using either an environment variable token or a hard-coded fallback credential, then walked the /mnt/user-data directory and uploaded every file to a threat actor-controlled repository via the GitHub Contents API; files were base64-encoded before transmission.
  • The /mnt/user-data path is the dedicated directory Anthropic's Claude AI uses to store user-provided uploads and AI-generated outputs in the background.
  • OX Security researchers observed approximately seven active exfiltrations in the attacker's repository before the associated GitHub account, unplowed3584, was taken down. That account was created hours before the malicious package appeared.
  • The package source contained the attacker's own GitHub private token, which OX Security used to identify and attribute the account.

Timeline

  • 2026-05-27 — GitHub account unplowed3584 created; mouse5212-super-formatter published to npm.
  • 2026-05-27 — OX Security researchers Moshe Siman Tov Bustan and Nir Zadok identify the package and publish their findings.
  • 2026-05-27 — Attacker's GitHub account taken down; package reported as still available on npm.

What remains unclear

  • Whether npm removed the package after the OX Security disclosure.
  • How many of the 676 estimated downloads resulted in successful file exfiltration.
  • Whether Anthropic has reviewed the incident or issued guidance to developers using Claude-integrated environments.

Broader context

AI assistants typically maintain dedicated filesystem paths for user-provided documents and generated outputs. A malicious package that knows those paths can extract files at the filesystem layer without interacting with the AI service directly. OX Security observed that the reduced barrier to generating functional malicious code with AI assistance is likely to produce more such incidents, including those authored by threat actors with limited operational security knowledge.

Sources

Selvam Sivakumar
Written by

Selvam Sivakumar

Founder, Elephas.app

Selvam Sivakumar is the founder of Elephas and an expert in AI, Mac apps, and productivity tools. He writes about practical ways professionals can use AI to work smarter while keeping their data private.

Related Resources

news

ChatGPT's Computer History: What It Actually Records on Your Mac

OpenAI's ChatGPT Computer History logs clicks, typing, and app switches on your Mac. See what it tracks, where the data goes, and if it's safe.

11 min
news

Does Claude Watermark Text You Wrote Yourself? Mostly Not

Anthropic explained how the Claude watermark works. It attaches only to words Claude chose, so proofreading your own writing leaves almost nothing to detect.

14 min
news

AI Going Rogue: 7 Real Examples From Four Major Labs

AI going rogue is not fiction. Seven real 2026 cases from OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta and Moonshot, what caused each one, and what it means for your own AI tools.

14 min
news

The Open Weights Fight: What NVIDIA, Anthropic, and Meta Are Really Arguing About

133 companies signed a letter defending open weight AI models. Anthropic pushed back. Zuckerberg made a third argument. Here is what each side really wants, and the one party none of them argues about.

15 min read